Temporal Signals: Human-in-the-Loop and Manual Approval Workflows

Temporal Signals#

Workflows often need input after they have started. A deployment workflow pauses for human approval. An expense workflow waits for a manager’s signature. An incident response workflow escalates after a timeout. Temporal signals are the mechanism for delivering external input to a running workflow.

A signal is a message sent to a workflow from outside – from another workflow, from a CLI command, from an HTTP endpoint, or from any system that has the Temporal client. The workflow receives the signal, processes it, and continues execution. Signals are durable: if the worker crashes after a signal is sent but before the workflow processes it, the signal is replayed when the worker restarts.

Autonomy Tiers and Escalation as Runtime Contracts, Not Prompt Instructions

An agent is dispatched on a task it cannot complete. The spec is broken. The dependency is missing. The credentials are wrong. What happens next determines whether you have an autonomous fleet or a fleet that quietly fails.

The most common answer — instructing the agent in its prompt to “ask for help if stuck” — does not survive contact with production. Agents either keep grinding and produce broken work, or output text that looks like a question but never reaches a human, or politely “complete” the task by writing nothing and reporting success. None of these failure modes are visible from the outside until the dashboards have been lying for hours.

Human-in-the-Loop Patterns: Approval Gates, Escalation, and Progressive Autonomy

Human-in-the-Loop Patterns#

The most common failure mode in agent-driven work is not a wrong answer – it is a correct action taken without permission. An agent that deletes a file to “clean up,” force-pushes a branch to “fix history,” or restarts a service to “apply changes” can cause more damage in one unauthorized action than a dozen wrong answers.

Human-in-the-loop design is not about limiting agent capability. It is about matching autonomy to risk. Safe, reversible actions should proceed without interruption. Dangerous, irreversible actions should require explicit approval. The challenge is building this classification into the workflow without turning every action into a confirmation dialog.

Terraform Safety for Agents: Plans, Applies, and the Human Approval Gate

Terraform Safety for Agents#

Terraform is the most dangerous tool most agents have access to. A single terraform apply can create, modify, or destroy real infrastructure — databases with production data, networking that carries live traffic, security groups that protect running services. There is no undo button. terraform destroy is not an undo — it is a different destructive action.

This article defines the safety protocols agents must follow when working with Terraform: what to check before every plan, how to read plan output for danger, how to present plans to humans, when to apply vs when to stop, and how to handle state conflicts.