Istio Security#

Istio provides three security capabilities that are difficult to implement without a service mesh: automatic mutual TLS between services, fine-grained authorization policies, and egress traffic control. These features work at the infrastructure layer, meaning applications do not need any code changes.

Automatic mTLS with PeerAuthentication#

Istio’s sidecar proxies can automatically encrypt all pod-to-pod traffic with mutual TLS. The key resource is PeerAuthentication. There are three modes:

• PERMISSIVE – Accepts both plaintext and mTLS traffic. This is the default and exists for migration. Do not leave it in production.
• STRICT – Requires mTLS for all traffic. Plaintext connections are rejected.
• DISABLE – Turns off mTLS entirely.

Enable strict mTLS across the entire mesh:

Kubernetes Audit Logging#

Kubernetes audit logging records every request to the API server: who made the request, what they asked for, and what happened. Without audit logging, you have no visibility into who accessed secrets, who changed RBAC roles, or who exec’d into a production pod. It is the foundation of security monitoring in Kubernetes.

Audit Policy#

The audit policy defines which events to record and at what detail level. There are four levels:

Defense in Depth#

No single network control stops every attack. Layer controls so that a failure in one does not compromise the system: host firewalls, Kubernetes network policies, service mesh encryption, API gateway authentication, and DNS security, each operating independently.

Host Firewall: iptables and nftables#

Every node should run a host firewall regardless of the orchestrator. Block everything by default:

# iptables: default deny with essential allows
iptables -P INPUT DROP
iptables -P FORWARD DROP
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT

# Allow established connections
iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT

# Allow SSH from management network only
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -s 10.0.100.0/24 -j ACCEPT

# Allow kubelet API (for k8s nodes)
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 10250 -s 10.0.0.0/16 -j ACCEPT

# Allow loopback
iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT

The nftables equivalent is more readable for complex rulesets:

Pod Security Standards#

Kubernetes Pod Security Standards define three security profiles that control what pods are allowed to do. Pod Security Admission (PSA) enforces these standards at the namespace level. This is the replacement for PodSecurityPolicy, which was removed in Kubernetes 1.25.

The Three Levels#

Privileged – Unrestricted. No security controls applied. Used for system-level workloads like CNI plugins, storage drivers, and logging agents that genuinely need host access.

Baseline – Prevents known privilege escalations. Blocks hostNetwork, hostPID, hostIPC, privileged containers, and most host path mounts. Allows most workloads to run without modification.

Regulatory Compliance Frameworks#

Regulatory compliance translates legal requirements into technical controls. Understanding which regulations apply to your system and mapping them to infrastructure and application design is a core engineering responsibility in regulated industries.

This guide covers four major frameworks and their practical implications for software architecture. These are not exhaustive compliance guides — they map the most impactful technical controls for each framework.

HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act)#

HIPAA applies to organizations handling Protected Health Information (PHI) — any data that can identify a patient and relates to their health condition, treatment, or payment.

The Problem with Environment Variables#

Environment variables are the most common way to pass secrets to applications. Every framework supports them and they require zero dependencies. They are also the least secure option. Any process running as the same user can read them via /proc/<pid>/environ on Linux. Crash dumps include the full environment. Child processes inherit all variables by default.

# Anyone with host access can read another process's environment
cat /proc/$(pgrep myapp)/environ | tr '\0' '\n' | grep DB_PASSWORD

Environment variables are acceptable for local development. For production secrets, use one of the patterns below.

Secure API Design#

Every API exposed to any network — public or internal — is an attack surface. The difference between a secure API and a vulnerable one is not exotic cryptography. It is consistent application of known patterns: authenticate every request, authorize every action, validate every input, and limit every resource.

Authentication Schemes#

API Keys#

The simplest scheme. The client sends a static key in a header:

GET /api/v1/data HTTP/1.1
Host: api.example.com
X-API-Key: sk_live_abc123def456

API keys are appropriate for:

Securing Docker-Based Validation Templates#

Validation templates define the environment agents use to test infrastructure changes. If a template runs containers as root, mounts the Docker socket, or skips resource limits, every agent that copies it inherits those risks. This reference covers the security patterns every docker-compose validation template must follow.

1. Non-Root Execution#

Containers run as root by default. A vulnerability in a root-running process gives an attacker full control inside the container and a much larger attack surface for container escapes.

Securing etcd#

etcd is the single most critical component in a Kubernetes cluster. It stores everything: pod specs, secrets, configmaps, RBAC rules, service account tokens, and all cluster state. By default, Kubernetes secrets are stored in etcd as base64-encoded plaintext. Anyone with read access to etcd has read access to every secret in the cluster. Securing etcd is not optional.

Why etcd Is the Crown Jewel#

Run this against an unencrypted etcd and you will see why:

Securing Kubernetes Ingress#

The ingress controller is the front door to your cluster. Every request from the internet passes through it, making it both the most exposed component and the best place to enforce security controls. Most teams deploy an ingress controller and stop at basic routing. That leaves the door wide open.

TLS Termination and HTTPS Enforcement#

Every ingress should terminate TLS. Never serve production traffic over plain HTTP. With nginx-ingress, force HTTPS redirects and add HSTS headers: